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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Little Timmy’s parents both work late, and he often finds himself 
sitting alone in front of the television after school. He doesn’t know the 
difference between “broadcast,” “cable,” or “direct broadcast satellite,” 
but he does know how to work the remote control.  One day, as he is 
clicking through the channels – 2, 4, 7, 93, 128, they’re all the same to him 
– he comes across a provocative scene.  What are those two people doing? 
he wonders with wide eyes.  And where are most of their clothes?  At that 
moment, Timmy’s father walks in and is shocked by the smut that runs 
during daytime hours on the basic tier of his satellite service.  Outraged, 
the man files a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC). Yet because this is a subscription service, the FCC does nothing. It 
matters not that satellite television is increasingly pervasive, nor that once 
installed it is easily accessible to children.  As households have 
transitioned from free broadcasting toward digital subscription services, 
complaints about unexpected indecency have increased exponentially.  
The FCC claims that without a change in the law, it lacks authority to act 
outside the realm of free broadcasting.  That statement is untrue: the FCC, 
not Congress or the courts, limited its reach to free, non-subscription 
broadcasts.  The self-imposed restriction is just as easily self-removed.  
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[2] When the Supreme Court explicitly approved indecency regulation 
over broadcast signals, it deemed compelling the government’s dual 
interests of protecting children and preventing unwanted indecency from 
entering private homes.1  In the intervening years since FCC v. Pacifica 
was decided, those interests have become no less compelling.  If anything, 
they have become more so. In 1978, the government had only to worry 
about indecency assaulting our children over the free broadcast signals – 
AM/FM radio, and VHF/UHF television.2  Satellite radio had not yet been 
offered to the public.  Cable television’s penetration rate among American 
households in 1981 was just twenty two point one percent.3  In the decades 
since Pacifica, new communications technologies have become ever more 
pervasive in American homes.  By 2001, cable’s penetration had more 
than tripled4 – yet the FCC still would not touch it.  Today, cable’s 
dominance has begun to wane, as direct broadcast satellite (DBS) services 
infiltrate American homes, transmitted in a specific band of radio 
frequency spectrum.5  While cable penetration has fallen a few percentage 
points since the turn of the century,6 DBS has enjoyed steady growth.7  As 
of April 2004, DBS penetration exceeded thirty percent in five states, 
                                                 
* Matthew S. Schwartz received his Juris Doctor from Georgetown University Law 
Center in 2007, and holds a B.A. in political science from the University of Michigan. 
The author would like to thank Professor Jerry Kang for his guidance in the early stages 
of this article; Professor Eugene Volokh for the invaluable advice contained in his book, 
“Academic Legal Writing”; and Professor David Carney, for demonstrating just how 
entertaining legal analysis can be. The author may be contacted at his Web site, 
http://www.MatthewSchwartz.us. 
1
 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-51(1978). 
2
 Unless stated otherwise, this paper will use the word “broadcast” to mean, generally, the 
transmission of communication signals wirelessly to radio, television or satellite 
receivers. 
3
 National Cable & Telecommunications Association, 
http://www.ncta.com/contentview.aspx?contentID=3577 (last visited May 10, 2007) 
(listing cable company penetration by year, since 1975). 
4
 Id. 
5
 See In re Inquiry into the Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct 
Broadcasting Satellite for the Period Following the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio 
Conference, 90 F.C.C. 2d 676 §100.1 (1982) (arguing direct broadcast satellite (DBS) 
service is a radio communication service in which signals from earth are retransmitted by 
high power, geostationary satellites for direct reception by small, inexpensive earth 
terminals). 
6
 See National Cable and Telecomm’n Ass’n, supra note 3.  
7
 National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Digital Cable Customers 2001-
2006, http://www.ncta.com/ContentView.aspx?contentId=58 (last visited May 10, 2007).  
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twenty percent in thirty one states, and fifteen percent in forty one states.8 
Still, the FCC holds its distance. 
 
[3] Together, cable and DBS command the great majority of viewers.  If 
history is any guide, penetration will only increase.  In comparison, 
audiences of over-the-air broadcasts will continue to dwindle.  In 1978, 
the United States government felt it was important to protect the children. 
“Young children lack the judgment necessary to consent to exposure to 
patently offensive language depicting sexual and excretory activities and 
organs. When unsupervised, they constitute a captive audience incapable 
of avoiding exposure.”9  Even today, the FCC acknowledges that the 
concerns stated in Pacifica are “equally, if not more, applicable . . . .”10 
 
[4] In this paper I will argue that if the government is serious about its 
stated goals of protecting children and the sanctity of the home, then the 
FCC should expand indecency regulations to cable and DBS.11  The 
current enforcement system – fining the handful of free broadcasters 
hundreds of thousands of dollars for each instance of indecency they air, 
while completely ignoring the much more extreme indecency 
commonplace on cable and DBS – is arbitrary and nonsensical. 
 
[5] Part II of the paper discusses the relevant statutory provisions and sets 
out the test for indecency.  Part III examines the case law, which sets the 
level of constitutional protection afforded indecent speech on broadcast 
and some parts of cable television. Part IV analyzes the regulatory history 
                                                 
8
 National Cable & Telecommunications Association, The Video Market is Fully 
Competitive, March 27, 2007, 
http://www.ncta.com/ContentView.aspx?hidenavlink=true&type=lpubtp10&contentId=3
595. 
9
 Brief of Petitioner, FCC v. Pacifica, No. 77-528 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1978).  
10
 In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 
and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, ¶ 10 (2006). 
11
 A quick note about terminology: This paper sometimes refers to the FCC, Congress, 
and “the government.” The latter term is all-encompassing, used generally to refer to all 
the bodies of our federal government. The first two terms have specific meanings:  
Congress is, of course, the legislative body that sets into law the general goals of “the 
government,” as elected by the people. The FCC, as an administrative agency and part of 
the executive branch, is in charge of executing the wishes of the legislative branch. This 
paper attempts precision whenever possible, but when appropriate, uses “the 
government” as a catch-all phrase. 
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of broadcast, cable and DBS since Pacifica, paying particular attention to 
a pair of often-overlooked FCC orders from the late 1980’s – orders that 
would point the direction of the FCC for years to come and, if carried out 
to their logical ends, would lead to conclusions in diametric opposition to 
each other and to the government’s supposedly compelling interests. Part 
V examines the FCC’s current approach to indecency regulation – 
pausing, at times, to ogle some colorful examples – and ultimately 
questions whether the FCC’s current policies are appropriate.  Part VI 
concludes with a thought about where the burden should lie: with parents 
who are trying to keep smut out of the home, or with adults who are trying 
to bring it in? 
 
[6] Upon the conclusion of this paper, a careful reader may feel the urge to 
broadcast an indecency of one’s own, and depending on that reader’s 
predilections, either be pleased that such a broadcast faces little threat 
from the FCC, or be aghast to learn that the FCC’s indecency enforcement 
division is sadly, needlessly irrelevant. 
 
II. FEDERAL RULES PROHIBITING INDECENCY 
 
[7] Federal statutes, viewed through the prism of court decisions, define 
the regulatory powers of the FCC and the limits placed on broadcasters. 
The Communications Act of 1934 charges the Commission12 with 
regulating “communication by wire and radio.”13  Pertinent here, it must 
enforce 18 U.S.C. § 1464, which criminalizes the utterance of “any 
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio 
communication.”14  “Radio communication” consists of “transmission[s] 
by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds.”15  
This includes AM/FM radio and television signals that are transmitted via 
radio waves (specifically, over VHF and UHF).16  By definition, this does 
                                                 
12
 This paper refers to the Federal Communications Commission interchangeably as the 
“FCC” or, at times, the “Commission.”  
13
 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2004). 
14
 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2004). 
15
 47 U.S.C. § 153(33) (2004). 
16
 About the FCC: A Consumer Guide to our Organization, Functions and Procedures, 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-247863A1.doc (last visited May 
10, 2007) (explaining Very High Frequency (VHF) is the part of the radio spectrum from 
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not include cable television, which travels from distributor to viewer not 
via broadcast signals but through cables strung along poles or buried 
underground.17  Section 1468(a) of the U.S.C. criminalizes the 
transmission of obscenity on cable or subscription television:  “Whoever 
knowingly utters any obscene language or distributes any obscene matter 
by means of cable television or subscription services on television, shall 
be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years or by a fine in 
accordance with this title, or both.”18 
 
[8] Obscenity and indecency are terms of art; to be obscene, material must 
satisfy the three-prong test created in Miller v. California: 1) “the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, wound find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;” 2) “the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law;” and 3) “the work, taken 
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”19 
Obscene speech lacks any First Amendment protection, but in practice, it 
is quite difficult to satisfy the Miller test because even if some parts of the 
work are beyond defense, it is unusual to find that the material lacks any 
value “as a whole.”20  If the test seems a bit subjective, that is because the 
justices had a difficult time determining what exactly constitutes 
obscenity. As Justice Potter Stewart famously commented in trying to 
determine whether a movie was obscene, “I shall not today attempt further 
to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that 
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly 
doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in 
this case is not that.”21 
 
                                                                                                                         
30 to 300 megahertz, including channels 2-13; and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) is the 
part of the radio spectrum from 300 to 3,000 megahertz, which includes channels 14-83). 
17
 In the most technical sense, this is untrue: Even cable television signals, which get to 
their final destination through a coaxial cable, are at one point transmitted through space 
via satellites and satellite dishes.  However, the FCC does not make that distinction. 
18
 18 U.S.C. § 1468(a) (2004). 
19
 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal citations omitted). 
20
 See In re Various Complaints Against the Cable/Satellite Television Program 
“Nip/Tuck,” 20 F.C.C.R. 4255, 4256 (2005). 
21
 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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[9] If defining obscenity flummoxes Supreme Court justices, it is no 
wonder the Court passed on creating a true test for indecency, which 
Pacifica defines as “nonconformance with accepted standards of 
morality.”22  The indecency test is similar to that in Miller, but drops the 
third prong: The material in question must 1) “describe or depict sexual or 
excretory organs or activities,” and 2) “be patently offensive as measured 
by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium.”23  As 
for what counts as patently offensive, the Court gave full discretion to the 
FCC. The Commission asserts: 
 
In our assessment of whether broadcast material is patently 
offensive, the full context in which the material appeared is 
critically important. Three principal factors are significant 
to this contextual analysis: (1) the explicitness or graphic 
nature of the description; (2) whether the material dwells 
on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory 
organs or activities; and (3) whether the material panders 
to, titillates, or shocks the audience. In examining these 
three factors, we must weigh and balance them on a case-
by-case basis to determine whether the broadcast material 
is patently offensive because each indecency case presents 
its own particular mix of these, and possibly, other factors. 
In particular cases, one or two of the factors may outweigh 
the others, either rendering the broadcast material patently 
offensive and consequently indecent, or, alternatively, 
removing the broadcast material from the realm of 
indecency.24 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978). 
23
 In re Indus. Guidance of the Comm’ns Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 
8002 (2001). 
24
 In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 
and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2668 (2006) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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[10] Indecency restrictions only apply from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., when 
children comprise a larger portion of the audience.25  Nor may 
broadcasters air “profane” material during this time period. Profanity 
involves language that, in context, is “so grossly offensive to members of 
the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.”26 The FCC, 
citing First Amendment concerns, has limited profanity prosecutions to 
“the universe of words that are sexual or excretory in nature or are derived 
from such terms.”27 Some of the “most offensive words in the English 
language” (e.g. “fuck” and “shit”) are “presumptively profane,” but in rare 
cases, the FCC will find such words acceptable when “demonstrably 
essential to the nature of an artistic or educational work or essential to 
informing viewers on a matter of public importance.”28 (Note, however: 
there is substantial uncertainty over the future of profanity prohibition, 
since the Second Circuit ruled in early June 2007 that the Commission’s 
new policy prohibiting “fleeting expletives” is arbitrary and capricious 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.29) 
 
[11] Section 1464 – the only federal statute prohibiting indecency – does 
not apply to direct broadcast satellite transmissions.30  As defined in the 
Communications Act, the term “broadcasting” is recognized as “the 
dissemination of radio communications intended to be received by the 
public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations.”31  Even though 
DBS signals are sent using radio communications, the FCC decided in 
1987 that DBS and all other subscription services are not “intended to be 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 See Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949 
(1992); see also Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act III), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996). 
26
 In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4981 (2004). 
27
 In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 
and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2669 (2006).  
28
 Id.  
29
 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 06-1760-AG, 2007 WL 1599032 (2d Cir. June 4, 
2007). See Section V(C), infra. 
30
 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2004). 
31
 47 U.S.C. § 153(6) (2000). 
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received by the public,” but rather only by subscribers.32  This runs 
counter, they said, to the concept of “broadcasting,” which requires that a 
transmitter does not intend to restrict reception of his signals at all.33 
 
III. CASE LAW 
 
[12] During the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
approved the FCC’s “spectrum scarcity” justification for its regulation of 
the airwaves. In NBC v. FCC,34 the Court noted that there was not enough 
free space on the electromagnetic spectrum to handle the explosion of 
radio stations in the wake of World War I.  “The result was confusion and 
chaos. With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard.”35  The Radio 
Act of 1927,36 the basic provisions of which were later incorporated into 
the Communications Act of 1934,37 created the FCC and gave it 
tremendous power not only to police the airwaves, but also to “determin[e] 
the composition of that traffic.”38  The FCC would fulfill this duty by 
looking toward the “public interest.”39  According to the Court, the FCC 
would choose which stations received broadcast licenses by determining 
which fit the “public interest, convenience or necessity, a criterion which 
is as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of 
delegated authority permit.”40 
 
[13] Thus, the FCC explicitly had the Court’s blessing to decide what 
kinds of broadcasts would best serve the public interest.  Broadcast 
indecency, however, was not a subject of any federal cases until the 1970s, 
                                                 
32
 In re Subscription Video, 2 F.C.C.R. 1001, 1002 (1987). 
33
 Section IV of this paper critically examines the reasons behind the FCC’s 1987 Order, 
and argues that the Order undercut the government’s greater goal of keeping indecency 
out of the home.  See In re Subscription Video, 2 F.C.C.R. at 1002. 
34
 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190 (1943) [Hereinafter NBC]. 
35
 Id. at 212. 
36
 The Radio Act of 1927, 47 U.S.C. § 81 (2004). 
37
 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2004). 
38
 Id. at 216. 
39
 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (2000); see also NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 
303(g) (“[T]he Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or 
necessity requires, shall . . . [s]tudy new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of 
frequencies, and generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the 
public interest”). 
40
 NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (internal quotations omitted). 
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and in FCC v. Pacifica, the Supreme Court no longer relied on spectrum 
scarcity to justify the FCC’s restrictions on speech. 
 
A. PACIFICA: PERVASIVENESS, CHILDREN, AND NUISANCE JUSTIFY SOME 
SPEECH RESTRICTIONS ON BROADCAST 
 
[14] The Supreme Court in Pacifica approved the FCC’s authority to 
determine what constituted indecency and held that it was not a violation 
of the First Amendment for the FCC to fine broadcasters for airing 
indecency.  This 1978 decision laid the policy groundwork that would 
direct the FCC’s regulatory mission for the rest of the century.  Since 
Pacifica, the FCC’s focus has remained on the regulation of free, over-the-
air broadcast signals, and nothing more. However, the Pacifica decision 
could just have easily led the FCC down the opposite path, allowing it to 
regulate indecency on emerging communications technologies. 
 
[15] Pacifica’s facts are colorful and now legendary. A man driving with 
his son at 2:00 p.m. was flipping through stations on the radio, when he 
came to a station playing a George Carlin monologue called “Filthy 
Words,” a satiric monologue discussing “the words you couldn’t say on 
the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn’t say, ever.”41  
A few weeks later, the man wrote a letter complaining to the 
Commission.42  The Commission decided not to fine the radio station, but 
rather to place an order in its file stating the station “could have been the 
subject of administrative sanctions” – an act that could harshen sanctions 
for subsequent violations.43  
 
[16] Pacifica challenged the Order, claiming its First Amendment rights 
had been abridged. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the 
constitutionality of indecency regulations on free, over-the-air broadcasts.  
This holding differed from previous decisions that gave strong First 
Amendment protections to creators of printed media,44 but the Court 
                                                 
41
 FCC v. Pacifica Found.., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978). For the complete text of the 
monologue, see id..at 751.  
42
 Id. at 730.  
43
 Id. (quoting In re Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM) 
New York, NY, 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 99 (1975)). 
44
 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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distinguished broadcast’s disparate treatment in two ways: 1) The 
broadcast media are uniquely pervasive in the lives of all Americans, and 
thus deserve greater restrictions than other forms of media;45 and 2) 
broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children.46  It is necessary here to 
examine these rationales in greater detail to determine what exactly was 
being regulated, why it was being regulated, and whether these two 
rationales are unique to free broadcasting, or whether they might apply to 
other forms of media. 
 
1. UNIQUELY PERVASIVE 
 
[17] Pervasiveness is surprisingly difficult to define. Perhaps this 
difficulty has led to the doctrinal confusion that has plagued the regulation 
of new communication mediums.  With very little elaboration, the 
Pacifica court declared that broadcast was to have weaker First 
Amendment protections than other forms of media because it was 
“uniquely pervasive.”47  Later courts have interpreted the word in 
whatever manner best fits their judicial goal. 
 
[18] Pacifica was likely using the word “pervasive” to refer to the 
broadcast medium’s ability to disturb a potential audience. Compared to 
printed text, which is silent and requires the audience to consciously make 
an effort to look at and read the message, radio transmissions require no 
such active engagement on the part of the listeners.  Sound clearly has the 
ability to disturb an audience more than printed text does.  Though this 
admittedly sounds too simple at first, it makes sense when considering the 
problem the Court was trying to solve: a modern entertainment medium 
with the ability to shock its audience in ways that text never could. 
 
[19] Radio communications are unique in that they have the ability to 
disturb people inside their homes, “where the individual’s right to be left 
alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”48  By 
turning on the radio or television, and accepting broadcast signals into 
one’s private space, one is essentially inviting guests into his house. The 
                                                 
45
 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. 
46
 Id. at 749.  
47
 Id. at 728. 
48
 Id. at 748. 
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problem occurs when the guests do not act as polite or refined as the host 
had expected.  
 
[20] Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, contrasts broadcast with 
public speech in Cohen v. California.49  “Outside the home, the balance 
between the offensive speaker and the unwilling audience may sometimes 
tip in favor of the speaker, requiring the offended listener to turn away.”50  
In contrast, “government may properly act in many situations to prohibit 
intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas.”51  
Indeed, the Cohen court contrasted the situation there with the far more 
substantial “interest in being free from unwanted expression in the 
confines of one’s own home.”52  Taken together, this suggests that any 
communications medium that enables unwanted speech to enter the home 
might possess the same level of pervasiveness as broadcast.  This reading 
would have broad ramifications for the entertainment industry and calls 
into question the FCC’s later decision to classify subscription services as 
non-broadcast, thus removing them from the FCC’s sphere of influence.53  
 
[21] Further, the Pacifica court noted that the nature of broadcasts renders 
prior warnings ineffectual. “Because the broadcast audience is constantly 
tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or 
viewer from unexpected program content.”54  When the father in Pacifica 
turned on the radio in the middle of the day, he did not hear the warnings 
that preceded the broadcast.55 
 
[22] “Pervasiveness” could also refer to the penetration rate of a medium 
in American households. Unlike wired entertainment technologies like 
cable, which in 1978 had relatively few subscribers, broadcast signals 
                                                 
49
 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that a state may not make the 
public display of the word “Fuck” a criminal offense). 
50
 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749. 
51
 Id., quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. 
52
 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22. 
53
 See Section IV(B), infra, for a thorough discussion of this decision. 
54
 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. 
55
 This was not a new problem. One of the earliest (and most exciting) examples of 
ineffectual warnings is the broadcast of Orson Welles’ “War of the Worlds” (Oct. 30, 
1938), which, despite being laced with announcements that it was a fictional piece, still 
managed to terrify a technologically naïve American public. 
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reached everyone who purchased a television.  In other words, it had a 
penetration rate of 100 percent among television owners.  This raises the 
question: What must a medium’s penetration be before it rises to the level 
of pervasiveness that concerned the Pacifica court?  Fifty percent of 
American homes?  More?  The Court never attempted to answer that 
question. 
 
2. UNIQUELY ACCESSIBLE TO CHILDREN 
 
[23] The other unique attribute of broadcast was its accessibility to 
children, far more so than other forms of media, such as printed text.  
Although a written message might be “incomprehensible to a first grader, 
Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an 
instant.”56  The immediacy of the spoken word – its ability to instantly 
pervade the consciousness of everyone in the listening audience – brought 
it into a different class than other forms of indecent communication. 
 
[24] Though listed as one of two reasons First Amendment protections do 
not apply to indecency on broadcast, the Court spent just one paragraph 
discussing why protecting the children is a compelling interest.  
Apparently, the Court felt little explanation was needed. It had long since 
held that the government has a dual interest in ensuring the well-being of 
the country’s youth and in supporting parents’ “claims to authority in their 
own household.”57 
 
[25] The pervasiveness of broadcast television and radio only magnified 
the problem of parental autonomy.  Now, not only did indecency bombard 
the culture at large, it also had the power to easily seep into the home.  As 
                                                 
56
 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749. 
57
 Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)).  Since Pacifica, 
protecting the children has also been a compelling interest. See Sable Commc’n of Calif., 
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 
(1982); Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996), discussed 
infra at Section III(C). Some commentators have examined what happens when the 
government’s idea of youthful well-being conflicts with parental claims to authority. In 
that situation, it appears the government’s sensibilities win the day. For a fascinating 
discussion of this conflict, see generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, What if I want my kids to 
watch pornography?: Protecting children from ‘indecent’ speech,  11 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 671 (2003). 
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the Court stated in Pacifica, “The ease with which children may obtain 
access to broadcast material … amply justif[ies] special treatment of 
indecent broadcasting.”58 
 
3. NUISANCE RATIONALE 
 
[26] At the heart of the FCC decision to make a note in Pacifica’s file was 
“a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important.”59  As the FCC 
saw it, indecent broadcasts “should be regulated by principles analogous 
to those found in the law of nuisance where the law generally speaks to 
channeling behavior more than actually prohibiting it . . .”60  Principles of 
nuisance law declare that the government “may protect individual privacy 
by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations to all speech 
irrespective of content.  When government [undertakes] selectively to 
shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are 
more offensive than others,” these selective exclusions may be upheld 
“when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home.”61  Here, the FCC 
prohibited the broadcast of indecent language in the mid-afternoon, thus 
enacting the kind of time regulation common in nuisance law. 
 
[27] In upholding the regulation, the Court explicitly left open the question 
of whether broadcasting the “Seven Dirty Words”62 monologue in the late 
evening hours was permissible. Indeed, the Court emphasized the 
narrowness of its holding, in that it was only holding that the FCC had not 
overstepped its power in this instance.63 Yet, as narrow holdings go, this 
one was momentous: It stood not simply for the fact that the FCC could 
prohibit broadcast of that specific indecent monologue at 2:00 in the 
afternoon, but for the principle that the FCC could ban any indecent 
broadcasts that constituted a nuisance.  The Court could not definitely 
determine what exactly constitutes a nuisance, except to say that context 
                                                 
58
 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. 
59
 Id.  
60
 Id. at 731 (quoting In re Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI 
(FM) New York, NY, 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 98 (internal quotations omitted)). 
61
 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). 
62
 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 777. 
63
 Id. at 750. 
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was all-important, and a host of variables was involved.64 The FCC would 
remain the ultimate arbiter – now, with the Court’s blessings. 
 
B. PACIFICA’S PROGENY: MISINTERPRETING THE SUPREME COURT 
 
[28] Pacifica was groundbreaking.  First Amendment notwithstanding, the 
Supreme Court had sanctioned the government’s power to restrict 
indecency on the airwaves.  Notably, the Supreme Court did not rely on 
the idea of spectrum scarcity – the justification for equal-access and other 
content-related provisions on broadcast – but simply on the concept that 
broadcast programming was pervasive, with the potential to influence 
children’s upbringing.  The narrowness of the court’s holding applied not 
to any particular fact pattern; it simply approved the FCC’s ability to 
contextually decide what was too indecent to air.65 
 
[29] However, some lower courts interpreted Pacifica’s narrowness to 
apply only to the specific medium at issue in Pacifica – free, over-the-air 
broadcasts.  In Cruz v. Ferre,66 the Circuit Court struck down as 
unconstitutional a Miami ordinance intended to regulate indecent and 
obscene material on cable television.  The relevant portion stated that 
“[n]o person shall by means of a cable television system knowingly 
distribute by wire or cable any obscene or indecent material,” where 
indecent material was defined as “material which is a representation or 
description of a human sexual or excretory organ or function which the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find 
to be patently offensive.”67 
 
[30] At the outset, note that the Miami ordinance would have meant a total 
ban on cable indecency, which is reason enough for a court to find it 
unconstitutional.68  In any case, the Cruz court found the fundamental 
                                                 
64
 See id. 
65
 See id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Making the sensitive judgments required in 
these cases is not easy. But this responsibility has been reposed initially in the 
Commission, and its judgment is entitled to respect.”).    
66
 Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1416 (11th Cir. 1985). 
67Id. at 1417 (quoting City of Miami Ordinance No. 9538).  
68
 E.g., Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  When 
analyzing restrictions on fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, courts apply a 
strict scrutiny standard, which requires that the government have a compelling interest 
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rationales of Pacifica inapplicable to cable television.  First, it held, 
Pacifica does not apply to cable television because cable is not an 
“intruder into the privacy of the home,” rather, a viewer must 
affirmatively subscribe to the service, decide whether to purchase 
premium channels, and make a monthly decision on whether to continue 
subscribing.69 Additionally, Cruz quickly dismissed Pacifica’s “nuisance 
rationale,” finding it does not apply to cable because there is no possibility 
that a non-cable subscriber will be confronted with this material.70 
 
[31] Moreover, Cruz held the concern about children having access to 
televised programming is “significantly weaker” in the context of cable 
because “parental manageability of cable television greatly exceeds the 
ability to manage the broadcast media.”71  Not only can parents choose 
whether or not to subscribe, but they can also obtain a “lockbox” blocking 
access to certain channels.72 
 
[32] Cruz represents a line of thinking that has persisted among many 
commentators to this day:  Cable television and other subscription services 
lack the pervasive qualities of broadcast, rendering Pacifica’s compelling 
interests inapplicable.  This conclusion cannot withstand thoughtful 
scrutiny. 
 
[33] Cruz notes that Pacifica was concerned with pervasiveness of the 
broadcast medium, which was not as great of a concern with cable.  Yet 
cable television possesses most of the same pervasive qualities as does 
broadcast. Cable television transmissions have the same ability to disturb a 
potential audience at home as does broadcast.  Prior warnings of 
potentially indecent material are just as ineffective over cable as they are 
over broadcast – cable audiences are no less likely than broadcast 
audiences to be constantly tuning in and out. 
 
                                                                                                                         
and the means for achieving that interest are narrowly tailored.  Total bans almost always 
fail strict scrutiny analyses.  
69
 Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420. 
70
 Id.  (“[C]able programming is available only to those who have the cable attached to 
their television sets.”) 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. at 1420-21. 
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[34] The similarities between cable and broadcast are not surprising 
considering the two mediums are not that distinct.  Whether information 
travels through the air or through a wire, both mediums require the user to 
take an affirmative step in order to see and hear the transmissions:  The 
broadcast audience must connect rabbit ears, and the cable audience must 
connect a cable.  The only major difference between cable and broadcast 
is that cable requires an extra step before it can come into the home: The 
audience must pay a monthly fee.  Logically, however, a subscription does 
not in and of itself nullify the concerns discussed above. 
 
[35] By treating a general decision to subscribe to the medium as a 
specific decision to accept the speech in question, Cruz completely 
misinterpreted the all-important nuisance rationale emphasized by the 
Court in Pacifica.73  Pacifica was concerned not with the audience’s intent 
to bring the medium into the home, but with its intent to listen to 
particular speech.74  Here, the issue is not whether a possibility exists that 
a non-cable subscriber will be confronted with indecent material on cable; 
of course there is a zero percent chance of that.  The proper question – and 
the correct way to view the nuisance rationale – is whether indecent 
material will confront an unwitting subscriber. 
 
[36] The Cruz court’s logic is analogous to the Pacifica court finding that 
because there is no chance that someone who lacks a TV will be 
confronted with indecent material over broadcast, the nuisance rationale 
does not apply because indecent programming over broadcast is only 
available to those who have brought a television set into their homes.  
Furthermore, broadcasts are not intruders because a viewer must 
affirmatively bring a television into his house, set up the device, and make 
a daily decision on whether to continue watching. 
 
[37] It may seem at first that this analogy is misplaced, for it gives 
potential television viewers the binary choices of on or off – television or 
no television – whereas the Cruz court implicitly understands that even if 
someone is dissatisfied with indecent cable offerings, free broadcast 
signals are still plentiful.75  Perhaps in 1985 this criticism was merited: 
                                                 
73
 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978); Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420.   
74
 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50. 
75
 See Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420.   
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Cable choices were relatively few, and a comparatively small proportion 
of the population subscribed.  Today, however, Cruz’s reasoning forces 
people into a classic Hobson’s choice:  Accept cable in its totality – 
indecency and all – or make due with three channels, rabbit ears, and poor 
picture quality. It is unfair to suggest to someone who wants to enjoy the 
benefits of a modern, connected world that his only real option in the face 
of cable indecency is to cancel the service. 
 
[38] Cruz is not the only case to find that because cable subscribers 
actively subscribe to the service, they deserve less government protection 
from indecency.  ACT III upheld a time-channeling provision in the Public 
Telecommunication Act of 1992 that required the FCC to prohibit the 
broadcasting of indecent programming “between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. 
on any day by any public radio station or public television station that 
goes off the air at or before 12 midnight.”76  In doing so, the court noted 
that “[u]nlike cable subscribers, who are offered such options as ‘pay-per-
view’ channels, broadcast audiences have no choice but to ‘subscribe’ to 
the entire output of traditional broadcasters.”77 
 
[39] This view demonstrates an ignorance of how cable television works.  
A cable subscriber can subscribe to various “tiers” of programming, each 
tier containing a block of channels.78  The basic tier includes a limited 
number of cable channels, and federal law requires that it also carry the 
local broadcast channels.  Cable operators usually offer additional 
packages of channels, sometimes called “Cable Programming Service 
Tiers.”79  Finally, premium stations like HBO are available for an 
additional fee, as are one-time “pay-per-view” programs.  DBS operators 
have similar tiers.80 
 
[40] Cable subscribers share many more similarities with broadcast 
viewers than the Cruz or Act III courts believe. Contrary to the insinuation, 
                                                 
76
 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  
77
 Id. at 660. 
78
 See generally ANDREW S. WISE & KIRAN DUWADI, “COMPETITION BETWEEN CABLE 
TELEVISION AND DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE – IT’S MORE COMPLICATED THAN YOU 
THINK” (2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-255869A1.pdf 
(last visited May 10, 2007). 
79
 Id. 
80
 Id. at 3. 
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cable television offerings are not a buffet from which subscribers may 
choose their favorite dishes. For example, Comcast, the largest cable 
company in the country,81 offers twenty channels on its “Limited Service;” 
seventy-two channels in “Full Standard Service;” dozens more channels in 
“Digital Classic,” “Digital Plus,” five different options of “Digital Plus 
Premium Packages,” and “Digital Premium;” dozens of premium stations 
devoted entirely to movies, music or original programming; and some 
“Digital PPV” (pay-per-view) and “Adult PPV” programs for additional 
purchase.82 This kind of tiered system is typical in the cable industry. 
 
[41] Cable viewers have some choice, but not nearly as much as the courts 
assume. If a Comcast subscriber wants to receive CNN or The History 
Channel, he must subscribe to “Full Standard Service,” which also 
includes MTV, Comedy Central, and FX, each of which has been known 
to push the limits of decency.83 Cable viewers, just like broadcast viewers, 
“have no choice but to ‘subscribe’ to the entire output” of their tier.84  
 
[42] Certainly there is validity in the argument that people who subscribe 
to certain extra channels on cable know what they are getting. One cannot 
imagine an HBO subscriber would be entirely surprised or outraged by the 
graphic language in a Chris Rock routine or on the latest episode of The 
Sopranos. However, premium channels do not have a monopoly on 
indecency. Because the FCC does not regulate indecency on anything 
other than broadcast, indecency could appear at any time and on any 
channel. 
 
[43] The Cruz court argues that cable requires less regulation because 
parents can block unwanted channels with a lockbox provided by the cable 
operator.  In a perfect world, a lockbox would be the ideal solution. 
Parents would know exactly where and when indecency would appear and 
                                                 
81
 Comcast, About Comcast Corporation, 
http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/About/CorporateInfo/CorporateInfo.html (last visited 
May10, 2007). 
82
 Comcast, Richmond - My Channel Lineup, 
http://www.comcast.com/customers/clu/channelLineup.ashx (last visited May 10, 2007). 
83
 See Denise Martin, FX Goes Beyond the Basics: Despite Threat of Indecency 
Legislation Cable Adds More Edgy Fare to Slate, VARIETY, Mar. 7, 2005, available at 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117918928?categoryid=1296&cs=1&s=h&p=0. 
84
 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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would preemptively block those channels.  Unfortunately, a lockbox is not 
effective because parents can only guess. In the process, they will block 
large amounts of “decent” programming (which, incidentally, they are still 
paying for as part of their chosen tier).  
 
[44] Unexpected indecency is, recall, the root of the problem.  The modern 
spate of indecency case law was sparked by a parent who unexpectedly 
heard the Carlin broadcasting while driving with a child in the car. As 
noted by the D.C. Circuit, lockboxes are only effective if people “knew in 
advance” that the programming would be undesirable.  “Otherwise, why 
would anyone bother to place a lockbox in operation? For parents to make 
an informed judgment about which course to follow, and when, they must 
have information in advance . . . .”85 
 
[45] Further, that advance information will only help parents if it is 
accurate. Lockboxes rely on a ratings system that tags programming with 
content descriptors to indicate the presence of specific types of content 
(e.g. “S” for sexual content, “L” for coarse language, etc.) Yet, according 
to a recent study by the Parents Television Council, an organization 
devoted to promoting family-friendly fare on TV, two-thirds of the shows 
it reviewed on six major broadcast networks lacked appropriate content 
descriptors.86 “None of the programs included in this analysis received a 
TV-MA rating,” the study authors write, “meaning every program was 
deemed appropriate by the networks to be viewed by a child aged fourteen 
or younger, including (for example) an episode of C.S.I. Miami in which a 
woman died of asphyxiation during an oral rape.”87 
 
[46] Even if the ratings were accurate, a lockbox is a surprisingly clumsy 
solution when compared to the commercial filtering options available on 
other mediums, such as the Internet.  Internet filters intercept all incoming 
content and allow parents to prevent specific types of indecency from 
                                                 
85
 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding as 
constitutional provisions of the 1992 Cable Act which, among other things, placed 
restrictions on leased access and public, educational and governmental [PEG] channels). 
86
 The Ratings Sham II: TV Executives Still Hiding Behind a System That Doesn’t Work, 
Parents Television Council, April 2007, 
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visited May 10, 2007). 
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becoming visible on screen;88 a lockbox simply blocks the signal on a 
given channel, regardless of what the channel is showing at the time.  
 
[47] Super Bowl XXXVIII provides an appropriate demonstration of the 
problems with lockboxes.  In February 2004, Janet Jackson’s infamous 
“wardrobe malfunction” caused her breast to be exposed during the 
halftime show, televised live on CBS, a standard broadcast channel.89  As 
broadcast channels are not supposed to broadcast indecent content, the 
lockbox would have had no effect because it would not have been in use. 
A parent concerned about protecting his child from indecency would have 
had no reason to preemptively block CBS that night.  FCC Commissioner 
Deborah Taylor Tate has expressed the same concerns: “Even the most 
diligent parent…cannot be expected to protect their [sic] children from 
indecent material broadcast during live sporting events or in commercials 
that appear during what is marketed to be ‘appropriate’ programming.”90  
 
[48] Because CBS was transmitted on a broadcast station, the FCC was 
able to fine the network for what it considered a clear violation of 
indecency rules during a purportedly family-friendly program.  In 2006, in 
response to increasing public concern over indecency, Congress passed the 
Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, which imposes a much 
harsher fine for indecent content. Formerly $32,500 per violation, each 
indecent episode now costs stations $325,000, with a maximum of 
$3,000,000 for any “continuing violation.”91  The president swiftly signed 
the bill into law.92  This increase has had an immediate effect on the 
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 See Wikipedia, Content Control Filter, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_filter (last 
visited May 10, 2007). 
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 See Bush Backs Tough TV Decency Laws, BBC NEWS, Apr. 15, 2005, 
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broadcast industry. For instance, aware that just one fine could bankrupt 
some of its stations, the Public Broadcasting Service recently instituted a 
tough new editing policy for shows airing before 10:00 p.m.:  Offensive 
words will not only be bleeped out, but from now on, editors must 
digitally mask the mouths of any on-camera speakers of indecency.93  
Further, “profanities expressed in compound words must be audibly 
bleeped in their entirety so that viewers cannot decipher the words.”94  
Previously, editors bleeped only the offending portion of the compound 
word.95  
 
[49] Whether a $325,000 fine for indecency is excessive is open to debate; 
this article does not seek to answer that question.  No one can deny, 
however, that such fines are having the intended effect.  Most broadcast 
stations will now go to great lengths to avoid being fined. Meanwhile, 
cable and DBS, immune to fines, continue to air indecency with impunity. 
When an open microphone caught President Bush using foul language in 
conversation with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, cable news networks 
repeatedly aired the offending portion of audio, while broadcast networks 
conspicuously bleeped out the word.96 
 
[50] Even advertisers, traditionally skittish about indecency, are beginning 
to embrace such programming as a direct line to their most valued 
demographic: Males age eighteen to forty-nine.97 Cable stations have little 
incentive to prevent the airing of indecency. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
President Bush stated that, “[b]y allowing the FCC to levy stiffer and more meaningful 
fines on broadcasters who violate decency standards, this law will ensure that 
broadcasters take seriously their duty to keep the public airwaves free of obscene, profane 
and indecent material. American families expect and deserve nothing less.” Id.  
93
 Elizabeth Jensen, Soldiers’ Words May Test PBS Language Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 22, 2006, at B7. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 See Posting of Amy Schatz to Washington Wire, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2006/07/17/bush’s-open-mike-indecent-disclosure/ (July 
17, 2006, 17:28 EDT). 
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C. DENVER AREA: SUPREME COURT OPENS THE DOOR TO NEW INDECENCY 
REGULATION 
 
[51] In Denver Area, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of 
protecting the children and upheld legislation giving cable operators the 
ability to restrict content due to indecency.98 Most notably, the court 
emphasized the similarities between cable and broadcast, noting that in 
some respects, cable presented even greater indecency concerns than the 
situation in Pacifica.  In so doing, the Court implicitly made clear that 
subscription services did indeed call into play the issue of indecency. 
 
[52] In 1992, Congress sought to deal with the problem of indecency on 
leased and public access cable channels.99  Section 10 of the Cable Act 
was meant to give cable operators the power to restrict “patently 
offensive” sexually-related content from leased and public access 
channels, and to segregate and block certain indecent programming while 
giving cable subscribers the ability to request that it be unblocked. 
 
[53] The Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium 
challenged the constitutionality of the provisions.100  The Supreme Court 
came to the conclusion that cable shares the same qualities as the 
broadcast that so concerned the Pacifica court, and the problem faced by 
Congress today was “remarkably similar” to the problems faced two 
decades earlier.101 The Court held that Section 10(a), which permitted the 
cable operator to decide whether to broadcast indecent programs on leased 
access channels, was consistent with the First Amendment.102  The other 
two provisions, which required operators to segregate and block channels 
with “patently offensive” programming, violated the First Amendment.103  
 
[54] Although the First Amendment ordinarily does not come into play 
when a private company controls the speech, the Court appreciated 
                                                 
98
 Denver Area Educ. Telcomms. Consortium v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
99
 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, § 10, 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (1992) (amending scattered sections of 47 U.S.C., but 
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petitioners’ concern that permitting cable operators to regulate speech on 
its leased access channels would create a private-censorship risk, 
necessitating a First Amendment analysis.104  Further, cable operators 
develop close relationships with officials in various levels of government 
since they need municipal permission and rights-of-way to string their 
cables.  This gives cable operators a government-imbued authority that 
invokes First Amendment issues.105 
 
[55] Noting at the outset that Congress may only regulate speech in “cases 
of extraordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care that we 
have not elsewhere required,”106 the Court quickly went on to emphasize 
that the governmental interest at stake – protecting children from exposure 
to patently offensive descriptions of sex – was an “extremely important 
justification.”107 
 
[56] All the factors the Pacifica court found important were present here: 
 
Cable television broadcasting, including access channel 
broadcasting, is as “accessible to children” as over-the-air 
broadcasting, if not more so. Cable television systems, 
including access channels, “have established a uniquely 
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.” “Patently 
offensive” material from these stations can “confron[t] the 
citizen” in the “privacy of the home,” with little or no prior 
warning. There is nothing to stop “adults who feel the 
need” from finding similar programming elsewhere, say, on 
tape or in theaters.108 
 
Without ever mentioning Cruz, the Court gutted its primary justifications. 
Cruz said cable was not an intruder in the home; Denver Area said it was.  
Cruz said cable was not as pervasive as broadcast; Denver Area said it 
was, having then established a sixty-three percent penetration rate in 
American homes.  Cruz said the concern about child access to cable 
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indecency was weaker than the situation in Pacifica; Denver Area said the 
concern was even more pertinent on cable. 
 
[57] It seems like such a common-sense observation:  of course cable 
subscribers can be confronted with unexpected indecency.  Yet, until the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that this was the case, the reasoning of the 
lower courts was muddled, new technologies stymieing their old 
analogies.  From the beginning of its analysis, the Denver Area Court was 
especially cognizant of the misleading potential of analogies.  “We are 
wary of the notion,” the Court wrote, “that a partial analogy in one 
context, for which we have developed doctrines, can compel a full range 
of decisions in such a new and changing area.”109 
 
[58] Crucially, by acknowledging that indecent speech can confront 
subscribers with little or no prior warning, the Court undermined Cruz’s 
entire argument that because people bring cable into their home, they 
clearly desire to accept the speech in question. Denver Area comes to this 
conclusion despite the fact that “cable subscribers tend to use guides more 
than do broadcast viewers”:  Cable subscribers’ tendency to “sample more 
channels before settling on a program” makes them “more, not less 
susceptible to random exposure to unwanted materials.”110 
 
[59] The Court also dismissed cable operators’ arguments that the FCC’s 
power to regulate content on broadcast had long depended on the scarcity 
rationale, which did not apply to cable. Petitioners had argued that the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
FCC111 to give cable broadcasts full First Amendment protection relied on 
the inapplicability of the spectrum scarcity problem to cable. The Denver 
court responded that the distinction, while relevant in Turner to justify 
structural regulations (i.e. “must carry” rules), “has little to do with a case 
that involves the effects of television viewing on children. Those effects 
are the result of how parents and children view television programming, 
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and how pervasive and intrusive that programming is. In that respect, 
cable and broadcast television differ little, if at all.”112 
 
[60] With that, the Court officially put to rest the idea that spectrum 
scarcity is involved in content restriction. Although it had been out of 
favor for some time – argued in Pacifica by the FCC but not used as a 
justification in the decision – the Court now explicitly stated it was not a 
factor to be considered. 
 
[61] The second section of the statute was found unconstitutional by six 
justices, and there is little question why.  Section 10(b) required cable 
operators to segregate and block patently offensive sex-related 
programming on leased channels.  To unblock the channel, subscribers 
were required to send a written request up to thirty days in advance. This 
system was clearly too restrictive, said the Court, and not practicable for 
adult cable viewers who might want “occasionally to watch a few, but not 
many, of the programs on the ‘patently offensive’ channel.”113 Further, 
requiring a written request was an onerous restriction that might cause 
subscribers to “fear for their reputations” if the request ever became 
public.114 
 
[62] As “obvious[ly]” restrictive as 10(b) was,115 it is useful in 
demonstrating the theoretical limits of protect-the-children jurisprudence. 
A plea for the continued innocence of our nation’s youth – in this case, 
“protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors”116 – is 
apparently not enough to justify every burdensome regulation the 
government may impose. It also demonstrates the difference between a 
nuanced policy – i.e. the FCC’s thoughtful contextual method for 
determining whether a broadcast is indecent – and a heavy-handed policy 
that makes the Supreme Court very uneasy. 
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[63] In Time Warner, the D.C. Circuit dealt with the next provision of the 
statute, 47 U.S.C. 558 § 10(d).117  This provision, which imposed 
obscenity restrictions on cable services, stripped operators of the immunity 
they once had if any obscenity ran on public access or leased cable 
channels.118  Picking up where Denver left off, the court found the section 
constitutional. “Section 10(d) merely imposes upon cable operators the 
same responsibility that others face. As the district court pointed out, no 
speakers – cable operators included – have a constitutional right to 
immunity from obscenity liability.”119 
 
[64] Taken by itself, Time Warner’s conclusion seems fairly 
straightforward. Taken in combination with Denver, however, new issues 
start to emerge. The Denver court, looking at 10(a) alone, found it 
Constitutional in part because it “permits the operator to decide whether or 
not to broadcast [indecent] programs”120 – and any regulation that offers 
leeway to a company to censor as it sees fit, as opposed to requiring a 
particular result, was perfectly okay. But when 10(d) enters the picture, the 
full import of § 10 becomes clear: By stripping operators of the immunity 
they once had from liability for aired obscenity, 10(a) looks less like an 
option and more like a requirement. In light of the sudden possibility that 
operators could be hit with criminal obscenity charges, 10(a)’s grant of 
autonomy doesn’t look as generous. To put it simply: 10(a) told cable 
operators that if they wanted to, they could censor “patently offensive” 
programming on leased access channels. If, for some reason, the cable 
operator decided to air the patently offensive programming, fine; but if 
anything obscene happened to run, the cable operator could now be found 
guilty of criminal obscenity charges. How could a cable operator know for 
sure if programming is indecent or obscene?  Why risk making the wrong 
decision, airing obscenity, and being subject to criminal penalties?  
Section 10(a) is starting to look far less permissive. 
 
[65] No discussion of indecency regulation is complete without discussing 
the Playboy Channel.  In the mid-1990s, Congress tried to do something 
about cable indecency. Many teenagers had been familiar with “signal 
                                                 
117
 47 U.S.C. § 10(d) (2004). 
118
 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (1996). 
119
 Id. at 981.  
120
 Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 733 (emphasis in original). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 4 
 
 27
bleed” – clear audio and scrambled video that “bled” from pay-per-view 
channels that were otherwise blocked. The Communications Decency Act 
of 1996 required cable operators of channels “primarily dedicated to 
sexually-oriented programming” to either totally block the signal and all 
associated signal bleed, or alternatively time-channel adult programming 
to the hours between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., which was the same “safe 
harbor” zone applied to broadcast. The Playboy Channel sued, claiming a 
violation of their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court struck 
down this method as too restrictive on speech and thus a violation of the 
First Amendment.121  
 
[66] The Congressional Research Service, researching the indecency case 
law in response to lawmaker interest in expanding regulation to cable, has 
found that protecting the children may no longer be compelling enough to 
satisfy strict scrutiny.   
 
In Playboy, the Court, applying strict scrutiny, struck down 
a speech restriction on cable television, in part because ‘for 
two-thirds of the day no household in those service areas 
could receive the programming, whether or not the 
household or the viewer wanted to do so.’ Thus, it appears 
likely that a court would find that to apply the FCC’s 
indecency restriction to cable television would be 
unconstitutional.”122 
 
[67] The Congressional Research Service misses an important distinction. 
In Playboy, the Court was dealing with a new federal statute that would 
lead to a 6:00 – 10:00 p.m. ban on indecent material being aired on 
primarily sexually-explicit channels. By its very definition, this was 
expected indecency, and the lockbox and other technological solutions 
discussed in Cruz would actually work as intended. The Court called this 
 
a key difference between cable television and the 
broadcasting media, which is the point on which this case 
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turns: Cable systems have the capacity to block unwanted 
channels on a household-by-household basis. . . .[T]argeted 
blocking enables the Government to support parental 
authority without affecting the First Amendment interests 
of speakers and willing listeners.123   
 
This blocking technology was a “less restrictive alternative” than the law 
Congress enacted, because it would be just as effective in protecting 
unwitting cable subscribers from receiving indecency, without 
unnecessarily limiting the rights of adult video subscribers to listen to (or 
watch) the speech they desired. 
 
[68] Playboy does not stand for the presumption that the First Amendment 
forbids the government from regulating indecent speech on cable; it stands 
for the well-settled presumption that the government may not use highly 
restrictive means to regulate speech when less restrictive means are readily 
available. For a pay-per-view cable channel that peddles exclusively in 
smut, blocking technologies are highly effective remedies. The problem is 
that blocks are totally ineffective when dealing with unexpected 
indecency. Protecting the children, while not compelling enough to 
warrant a draconian block on all sexual programming from adults who 
explicitly request it, is likely still compelling enough to warrant the 
prohibition of indecency on general cable channels. 
 
IV. INCREASED ENFORCEMENT, REDUCED SCOPE:  THE FCC DECLARES 
WAR AGAINST BROADCAST INDECENCY – AND THEN REDEFINES 
“BROADCAST” TO EXCLUDE ALL EMERGING BROADCAST 
TECHNOLOGIES FROM ITS INDECENCY RULES 
 
A. FCC PROMULGATES AN ORDER EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF 
“INDECENCY” 
 
[69] In the decade following Pacifica, the FCC was rather timid in its 
enforcement, only focusing on the seven words in the Carlin 
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monologue.124 By the late 1980s, however, the FCC lost much of is 
reticence in going after indecency on the airwaves.  Discontinuing its 
adherence to the “seven dirty words” standard promulgated in Pacifica, 
the FCC determined it was “more appropriate” to use the broader 
definition of indecency advanced in Pacifica: “language or material that 
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or 
excretory activities or organs.”125 Further relying on Pacifica, the FCC 
ruled that “such indecency will be actionable if broadcast or transmitted at 
a time of day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the 
audience.”126  For the first time since Pacifica was handed down, the 
Commission finally embraced its broad agency power of basing regulation 
on context rather than on the few words used in Carlin’s monologue.127 
 
[70] During Pacifica, the FCC argued that spectrum scarcity 
considerations bolstered its authority to prohibit indecency.128 The Court, 
however, did not discuss scarcity when approving the FCC’s authority. 
Now, specifically rejecting the scarcity rationale, the FCC relied instead 
on Pacifica’s “nuisance rationale” to support its decision to time-channel 
broadcast indecency to the early morning hours.129 With its newfound 
power, the FCC took action against two commercial radio stations, a 
student-run station at the University of California, and an amateur 
licensee.130 
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[71] Had the FCC reaffirmed its original argument that regulations were 
based on scarcity, limiting indecency regulations to broadcast would 
arguably be warranted, for the problem would be unique to broadcast:  
Spectrum scarcity does not occur on cable because cable does not use the 
e-m spectrum to propagate its signal. Should a cable use up its available 
bandwidth, the cable operator could install additional cables. 
 
[72] Taken alone, the Commission’s rejection of the scarcity rationale 
might have indicated a desire to expand its power into new 
communications technologies. Ironically, however, at the same time the 
FCC was stepping up both the scope and the enforcement of its indecency 
regulation, it issued an administrative order that effectively nullified its 
ability to control indecency into the future.131 What could have been a 
massive power grab was offset by an order clarifying the definition of 
“broadcast” and in the process drastically limiting the agency’s purview. 
 
B. FCC PROMULGATES AN ORDER LIMITING THE DEFINITION OF 
“BROADCASTING” AND EXEMPTS DBS AND OTHER SUBSCRIPTION 
SERVICES FROM BROADCASTING REQUIREMENTS 
 
[73] In response to emerging technologies, the FCC issued a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, which sought to properly classify certain 
subscription video programming services.132  The Notice had tentatively 
concluded that “the characteristics of such services made classification of 
them as point-to-multipoint, non-broadcast services appropriate.”133  The 
Communications Act of 1934, it said, was buckling under the strain of 
new technologies that defied easy classification. The result was “different 
regulatory treatment of services which share what may be considered 
important characteristics.”134  Put simply, some subscription services were 
facing the same regulation as standard broadcast services, while others 
were not.135  The FCC could take one of two actions in order to fix the 
inconsistency: Expand regulation to subscription services, or free all of 
those services from the requirements faced by broadcasters. 
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[74] The question before the FCC was whether DBS and other such 
subscription services counted as “broadcasting.” The FCC examined the 
origins of broadcasting and learned that radio pioneers had distinguished 
between “unaddressed radio service directed to the indeterminate public at 
large, and multiple addressed transmission, intended for a prescribed 
number of particular receive points.”136  This definition was later wrapped 
into the 1934 Communications Act.137 
 
[75] Note, of course, that there was no way the original radio 
communication regulators were contemplating services like DBS. The 
technology simply did not exist. It is far more likely they were considering 
private communications from one company or individual to another. Yet 
after considering the medium’s history and finding no legislative history 
indicating otherwise, the FCC decided that because the intent of a 
subscription service is to limit access to its signals, subscription services 
should not be classified as broadcasting.138 
 
[76] Interestingly, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia had 
reached the opposite conclusion three years earlier, ruling that satellite 
radio clearly fit the definition of broadcasting, despite it being a 
subscription service.139  In National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC, 
the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed in part and vacated in part a 1982 FCC 
Order that, in essence, “deregulate[d] DBS even before the service was 
born.”140  While commending the Commission for attempting to ensure 
that the development of DBS would not be impeded, the Court also found 
that, “in its zeal to promote this new technology, the FCC gave short shrift 
to certain of its statutory obligations.”141 
 
[77] In 1982, the FCC had adopted interim DBS regulations designed to 
assure “maximum flexibility” to the new industry.142  In order to help 
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facilitate its growth, the FCC implemented a system that would free DBS 
from the major regulatory restrictions faced by broadcasters. If a DBS 
satellite owner chose to provide service directly to homes while retaining 
control over the content of the transmissions, it would be considered a 
broadcaster and subject to the Communications Act’s restrictions. 
Alternatively, the DBS satellite owner could choose to operate as a 
common carrier instead of a broadcaster and not face broadcaster 
regulations.143 
 
[78] The court held that the Commission had engaged in “forbidden 
statutory experimentation” in allowing DBS systems to be classified as 
non-broadcast. “When DBS systems transmit signals directly to homes 
with the intent that those signals be received by the public, such 
transmissions rather clearly fit the definition of broadcasting; radio 
communications are being disseminated with the intent that they be 
received by the public.”144 The court also quoted a 1966 decision in which 
the FCC itself declared that the subscriptions do not negate a medium’s 
broadcast-like qualities: “[B]roadcasting remains broadcasting even 
though a segment of the public is unable to view programs without special 
equipment,” the FCC wrote.  “[S]ubscription operations are intended to be 
received by the public [and] such operations would be able to comply with 
all requirements applicable to broadcasting[.]”145 
 
[79] The FCC briefly considered NAB before finalizing its 1987 Order. 
Recognizing that categorizing subscription services as broadcasting would 
have a “considerable impact” on the statutory obligations of these kinds of 
services, the Commission determined it would be “both legally 
permissible and more appropriate as a matter of regulatory policy” to 
reclassify subscription services as non-broadcast.146 
 
[80] The FCC knew that its new definition of broadcast would have wide-
ranging effects.  “We are not unmindful of the fact that classification of 
subscription program services as non-broadcast will have other regulatory 
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consequences,” the Commission wrote. For instance, “such services would 
not be subject to the Commission’s broadcast equal employment 
opportunity rules.”147  The Commission decided that such effects would be 
de minimus, and proceeded accordingly. 
 
[81] In a footnote to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking preceding the 
actual Order, the Commission briefly mentioned obscenity as part of a 
discussion about its authority to impose content-related requirements on 
programmers who were not radio station licensees: 
 
[W]hen Congress has decided to impose program content 
restrictions on persons other than licensees, it has ordinarily 
done so expressly.  See, e.g., the Act’s obscenity 
prohibitions (now codified in the U.S. Criminal Code), 
which apply to “[w]hoever utters obscene language by 
means of radio communication.”148 
 
Thus, the footnote said, should the FCC reclassify DBS as non-broadcast, 
its “authority to impose content related requirements on programmers . . . 
[may] be open to question.”149 
 
[82] That was the extent of the FCC’s discussion on the effect DBS 
reclassification would have on indecency enforcement.  The 1987 Order 
finalizing the reclassification mentioned neither indecency nor obscenity 
as a factor to consider – a “regulatory consequence” apparently no longer 
worth discussing. 
 
[83] Without explicitly knowing Congress’s intent in this pressing and 
controversial area, and based in large part on the Congressional intent it 
could divine from the Communications Act, the FCC in one fell swoop 
exempted an entire communications medium from indecency regulations. 
As the D.C. Circuit Court had pointed out a few years earlier, this kind of 
sweeping action is problematic. “[T]he fact that Congress did not in 1934 
contemplate DBS does not give the Commission a blank check to regulate 
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DBS in any way it deems fit.”150  Despite broadcaster concerns that such a 
reclassification after the circuit court had specifically ruled otherwise 
might constitute a forbidden experiment with the Commission’s statutory 
mandate,151 the circuit court ultimately upheld the FCC’s decision as 
neither arbitrary nor capricious.152 
 
[84] It is ironic that the FCC would seek to expand the definition of 
indecency, thereby increasing its power, while simultaneously limiting 
that power to free broadcast media. The FCC could effortlessly have gone 
in the other direction.  “Given the Commission’s apparent lack of desire to 
confront its confused history of STV [subscription television] regulation, 
and given its discretion to classify the new DBS services as it chose, the 
FCC on remand could just as easily have imposed broadcast-type 
regulation on DBS operators as removed such regulation from STV 
operators.”153  Had the Commission decided to characterize subscription 
services as broadcast, the government’s goal of weeding out indecency in 
entertainment would have been easily achievable. By characterizing 
subscription services as non-broadcast, the FCC was severely hampering 
its ability to regulate emerging technologies. 
 
[85] Why would the FCC do such a thing, especially coming just a few 
months after the public notice that it was ramping up indecency 
enforcement?  There are a few possibilities: As the final Order nowhere 
mentioned indecency concerns, perhaps the FCC did not realize it was 
limiting its power in this way.  This suggestion is bolstered by the fact that 
the Order seemed mostly focused on equal-access regulatory concerns.  
However, the footnote in the earlier Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
mentioning obscenity seems to counter such a reading. 
 
[86] Perhaps the reason is more mundane:  Different divisions of the FCC 
deal with different matters.154  How much input did the indecency 
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enforcement division have in this Order? Still more likely is that no one 
stopped to think about unintended consequences. How could the FCC 
have known that, in twenty years, DBS would be one of the fastest-
growing forms of home entertainment?  Whatever the reason, it is clear 
that freeing DBS of indecency regulations was not the aim of the measure, 
but merely a byproduct. 
 
C. CONGRESS PASSES THE 1992 CABLE ACT, APPLYING BROADCASTING 
REQUIREMENTS TO DBS AND OTHER MULTICHANNEL DISTRIBUTORS 
 
[87] In any case, five years later Congress reversed much of what the FCC 
had decided in the 1987 Order:  now, satellite services were to be 
regulated. In the 1992 Cable Act, Congress promulgated regulations about 
program access, must-carry provisions, and ownership limits.155 These 
regulations applied to all “multichannel” distributors, which includes DBS 
as well as anyone who “makes available for purchase by subscribers or 
customers, multiple channels of video programming.”156 
 
[88] One commenter downplays the importance of the regulations that the 
1992 Act imposed on DBS, calling them only “modest broadcaster 
duties.”157  Perhaps the duties were modest, but the very idea that 
Congress was imposing any duties at all demonstrated a fundamental 
difference in opinion with the FCC about the proper scope of regulation. 
The FCC, hesitant to regulate such a “nascent industry,”158 decided that all 
subscription services, including DBS, should be free of broadcast-like 
restrictions. Now, Congress essentially reversed and remanded. The only 
lingering remnant of the 1987 Order was its characterization of DBS as a 
“subscription service,” which in recent years has been cited for little more 
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than the proposition that “subscription-based satellite services are not 
‘broadcasting’ as defined by the Communications Act.”159 
 
[89] This is a powerful idea, invoking Cruz’s faulty logic about the 
inappropriateness of applying Pacifica’s indecency rationales to cable 
television. It is not surprising that seventeen years later, the FCC would 
begin invoking the Order for the principle that, as a subscription service, 
DBS was not subject to indecency rules. 
 
V. APPLICATION: “SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES DO NOT CALL INTO 
PLAY THE ISSUE OF INDECENCY” 
 
[90] In 2005, the FCC received complaints about “Nip/Tuck,” a television 
program shown on the FX Network.160  FX is part of the basic tier offered 
with many cable and satellite subscription services.161  Apparently the 
basic tier gets you quite a bit these days:  According to the complaints, the 
show “depicts actors engaged in an array of simulated sexual acts, 
including oral, anal, and genital intercourse, as well as nudity.”162 
 
[91] The FCC’s response was succinct: “[T]he Commission does not 
regulate cable indecency.”163  First, it explained, the criminal code 
restriction on indecency, 18 USC § 1464, only applies to “radio 
communication,” not to programming carried over cables.  Second, both 
cable and DBS are subscription services, which itself means two things: 1) 
As the 1987 Order specified, they are not broadcasting as defined by the 
Communications Act and so the Commission has no regulatory control 
over the content; and 2) subscription services “do not call into play the 
issue of indecency.”164 
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[92] The response to cable indecency complaints has become, essentially, 
a form letter:  “Dear So-and-So, the FCC does not regulate cable or 
satellite indecency because subscription services do not call into play the 
issue of indecency. Period.” They repeat often-used explanations, note that 
new technologies built into cable and DBS services give users the power 
to deal with unwanted indecency, and that is that – a few pages at most.165  
The Commission does not pause to ask if the old explanations are still 
valid.  They do not recognize the fallacies in Cruz.  They do not ponder 
whether a decision to subscribe is really equivalent to a decision to accept 
indecency; the complaints, by their very existence, indicate it is not.  They 
do not ask whether technology really is the end-all be-all of indecency 
protection.  Technological tools are only as effective as the person who 
programs them; what happens when the programmer is not aware that 
indecency might appear, unexpectedly, on a given program?  As more 
form decisions are published, all thoughtful arguments to the contrary will 
be crushed by an ever growing mountain of inexorable precedent. 
 
[93] The greatest irony is that the 1987 Order – which the FCC cites for 
the proposition that cable and DBS are subscription services and, 
therefore, not subject to indecency restrictions – had nothing to do with 
indecency. 
 
A. THE FCC STUBBORNLY ADHERES TO FORMALISTIC DISTINCTIONS. 
 
[94] In holding so steadfastly to its past rulings, the FCC is proving itself 
concerned solely with consistent application of law, while paying no heed 
at all to consistency of result.  In the buildup to the 1987 Order, the FCC 
took great pains to logically extend the original analogy of broadcasting, 
to see whether it would apply to today’s technologies. The Commission 
noted that radio pioneers had borrowed the term “broadcasting” from 
farming:  a “broad cast” is when one scatters seeds in a wide arc – casting 
them broadly so as to reach the widest possible area.166 Thus, the FCC 
reasoned, “broadcasting” entails transmitting a radio signal to as many 
people as possible. Because transmitters of subscription services intend for 
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their signals to be received only by subscribers – and not by as many 
people as possible – it is not broadcasting. 
 
[95] By performing these mental gymnastics, the FCC essentially changed 
the definition of broadcasting, making the focus not the type of 
communications technology used, but the purpose of using that 
technology.  Today, two main reasons are offered to explain why 
subscription services do not call into play the issue of indecency – from 
both the sender’s and receiver’s perspective: 1) Subscription services are 
not intended to reach the entire public, and, therefore, broadcaster rules do 
not apply, and 2) As argued in Cruz, subscribers to a service intend to 
receive indecent speech, so Pacifica’s nuisance rationales do not apply. As 
explained earlier, this reasoning is faulty, because: 1) Congress went 
ahead and applied broadcaster rules to subscriptions services anyway in 
the 1992 Act, and 2) Denver Area invalidated Cruz’s reasoning, holding 
that unexpected indecency can confront unwitting subscribers. Yet the 
FCC continues to blindly cite the subscription nature of DBS as the reason 
it is not subject to indecency rules. 
 
[96] This stubborn adherence to formalistic distinctions – which may have 
made sense 20 years ago – is irrational today, as communications 
technologies move toward convergence. As the Denver Area court so 
wisely noted in determining the First Amendment protections to be 
afforded to cable, “no definitive choice among competing analogies 
(broadcast, common carrier, bookstore) allows us to declare a rigid single 
standard, good for now and for all future media and purposes.”167  Such 
judicial formulas are “so rigid that they become a straitjacket that disables 
government from responding to serious problems. … [A]ware as we are of 
the changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial 
structure related to telecommunications, we believe it unwise and 
unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or specific set of words 
now.”168 
 
[97] The FCC’s rigid definition of broadcast is a straitjacket preventing 
government from responding to the indecency concerns that accompany 
increasingly pervasive technology. Nowhere in recent years has the 
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Commission asked whether the government’s venerable aims, argued so 
forcefully in Pacifica, are still being met. When broadcast was king, cable 
and DBS were but nascent industries facing a precarious and uncertain 
future; today, as broadcast’s reign comes to an end, cable and DBS are 
thriving. Affording them the same laissez-faire protections they received 
in the 1980s undermines longstanding government policies against 
indecency. It would be one thing if the FCC stopped enforcing indecency 
entirely – at least that would be logically consistent. Yet by ramping up 
indecency enforcement on broadcast, while ignoring indecency on all 
subscription services – hundreds of channels in all – the FCC is subverting 
the government’s compelling interest in punishing indecency. 
 
[98] Former FCC Chairman Michael Powell has expressed similar 
reservations:  “I think that if you want to talk about the effect of these 
mediums in our society, you are really kidding yourself if you think you 
can wall off one small part so your children never hear the ‘F-word’ again 
through other mediums.”169  Admittedly, Powell was arguing for scaling 
down indecency regulations, but his words ring just as true for opponents 
of indecency. 
 
B. ARBITRARY AND NONSENSICAL OUTCOMES 
 
[99] Until the government standardizes indecency rules across all types of 
technologies, we will continue to see arbitrary and nonsensical outcomes.  
For example, San Diego radio station KGB-FM repeatedly played the 
following song, entitled “Candy Wrapper”: 
 
It was another Pay Day and I was tired of being a Mr. 
Goodbar, when I saw Miss Hershey standing behind the 
Powerhouse on the corner of Clark and 5th Avenue. I 
whipped out my Whopper and whispered, Hey Sweetart, 
How’d you’d like to Crunch on my Big Hunk for a Million 
Dollar Bar? Well, she immediately went down on my 
Tootsie Roll and you know, it was like pure Almond Joy. I 
couldn’t help but grab her delicious Mounds ‘cause it was 
easy to see that this little Twix had the Red Hots. It was all 
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I could do to hold back a Snicker and a Krackle as my 
Butterfinger went up her tight little Kit Kat, and she started 
to scream Oh, Henry! Oh Henry! Soon she was fondling 
my Peter Paul and Zagnuts and I knew it wouldn’t be long 
before I blew my Milk Duds clear to Mars and gave her a 
taste of the old Milky Way. She asked if I was into M & 
M’s and I said, Hey, Chicklet, no kinky stuff. I said, Look 
you little Reese Piece, don't be a Zero, be a Life Saver, why 
don’t you just take my Whatchamacallit and slip it up your 
Bit-O-Honey. Oh, what a piece of Juicy Fruit she was too. 
She screamed Oh, Crackerjack. You’re better than the 
Three Musketeers! as I rammed my Ding Dong up her 
Rocky Road and into her Peanut Butter Cup. Well, I was 
giving it to her Good ‘n Plenty, and all of a sudden, my 
Starburst. Yeah, as luck would have it, she started to grow a 
bit Chunky and complained of a Wrigley in her stomach. 
Sure enough, nine months later, out popped a Baby Ruth.170 
 
Indecent?  Absolutely, said the FCC: Despite the double entendre and 
indirect references, it was found to be inescapably sexual.171  As one 
decision eloquently stated, “[N]otwithstanding the use of candy bar names 
to symbolize sexual activities, the titillating and pandering nature of the 
song makes any thought of candy bars peripheral at best.”172 
 
[100] This incident demonstrates the length to which the FCC can and will 
go.  The song, while clearly pandering to listeners’ baser instincts, 
contained neither a trace of the seven dirty words nor any explicit 
references to body parts.  It was a play on language, similar to George 
Carlin’s monologue, but arguably less profane.  Despite the absence of 
profanity, the FCC did not hesitate to exercise its enforcement powers – 
because it was sent to listeners via broadcast radio. 
 
[101] The same exact song, transmitted in its entirety via satellite radio, 
would face no penalty at all.  Is the distinction so relevant anymore?  
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Many consumer electronics today are capable of receiving AM, FM and 
satellite signals, and can switch between them with the press of a 
button.173  Receivers for Sirius and XM Radio, the two main competitors 
in today’s market, are available as pre-installed options in dozens of 
automobile brands.174  Not only that, but Ford Motor Company recently 
inked a deal with Sirius, to put factory-installed satellite radio receivers in 
every Ford vehicle sold in Canada, with free included subscriptions, by 
2008.175  The same fate will almost certainly befall radio in the States, 
considering that Ford recently announced plans to quadruple the number 
of pre-installed Sirius receivers in all its cars.176 
 
[102] Free satellite radio comes standard in many rental cars, and free 
subscriptions to satellite radio are common with the purchase of a new car, 
developments the National Association of Broadcasters finds especially 
troubling.  In a letter to the FCC, NAB Chairman David K. Rehr noted his 
concern at what he deemed an “increasingly unjustifiable” disparity in the 
regulatory treatment of broadcast and satellite radio: 
 
To the extent that satellite radio service is now received 
free by non subscribers, this undermines the frequently-
made argument that satellite radio should be regulated very 
differently than traditional broadcast radio simply because 
satellite is a subscription service. … [M]erely asserting that 
“subscription-based services do not call into play the issue 
of indecency” no longer seems adequate to justify the 
inequitable regulatory treatment of free over-the-air and 
satellite radio.177 
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[103] Also troubling to the NAB is the recent discovery of a new kind of 
signal bleed:  satellite radio receivers in some cars are so powerful that 
they inadvertently re-broadcast their signals far beyond the car itself, in 
some cases up to a quarter mile away.178  These signals are then received 
by radios tuned to free broadcast stations.179  This phenomenon is most 
invasive in the lower FM band – typically the domain of National Public 
Radio and religious stations – whose audiences, ironically, are the most 
likely to object to indecency.180  Complaints received by the NAB 
demonstrate that “members of the public today are disturbed about 
receiving ‘unexpected’ sexually explicit and profane satellite program 
content, particularly if children are listening.”181 
 
[104] It is likely that a technological fix will cure the signal bleed 
problem, because federal law prohibits such strong FM interference, and 
satellite radio makers have already halted production of the offending 
models and are working with the FCC to keep the situation under 
control.182  But the issue of free subscriptions to car renters and purchasers 
raises a pricklier concern.  The standard objection to Cruz is that a 
decision to subscribe to a particular medium is not tantamount to a 
decision to accept all unexpected indecency on that medium. This 
objection is infinitely more pertinent when applied to a listener who didn’t 
even subscribe to begin with.  When free and subscription radio are 
combined on one receiver that can instantly switch between the two 
signals, the irrationality of the regulatory disparities becomes clear. 
 
[105] Again, former chairman Powell sums up the increasing obsolescence 
of traditional decency rules: 
 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.nab.org/images/xertimages/corpcomm/pressrel/060506_dkr_martin_satradio.
pdf (internal citations omitted). 
178
 See Tune in NPR, get Howard Stern Instead, MSNBC, April 28, 2006. 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12530600/ (last visited May 10, 2007). 
179
 Id.   
180
 Id.  
181
 See Letter from David K. Kehr to Kevin J. Martin, supra note 176, ¶ 6. 
182
 Greg Levine, Halt: Karmazin’s Sirius Confronts FCC’s FM Rule, FORBES, July 20, 
2006. http://www.forbes.com/2006/07/20/sirius-fcc-production-
cx_gl_0720autofacescan04.html. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 4 
 
 43
At some point, if the country is serious about wanting to 
debate what the public interest is in the media, then it is 
going to have to broaden its mind and its perspective 
enormously. I am going to use my children as an example: 
Ask them if they know what a broadcast channel is. They 
do not. They have a clicker in their hand, and it goes 7, 9, 
10, 12, 159, 222, and they do not know the difference 
between 214 and 7. I find it phenomenal that the First 
Amendment changes channels too.183 
 
C. THE FCC FIGHTS A LOSING BATTLE AGAINST “FLEETING EXPLETIVES” 
WHILE FAR MORE EGREGIOUS CONTENT GOES UNTOUCHED 
 
[106] “Fleeting expletives” had never concerned the FCC. For several 
years, the Commission had affirmed the prevailing view that a fleeting 
expletive was not actionable. In its 2001 “Industry Guidance” statement, 
the Commission stated that in order to be patently offensive, it would 
strongly weigh “whether the material dwells on or repeats at length 
descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities,” distinguishing 
between material that “dwells” (indecent) and material that was “fleeting 
and isolated” (not indecent).184 In 2003, it denied complaints about 
performer Bono’s use of the phrase “fucking brilliant” at the 2002 Golden 
Globe Awards, holding that “fleeting and isolated remarks of this nature 
do not warrant Commission action.”185 
 
[107] Everything changed in 2004, when the full Commission reversed the 
Enforcement Bureau’s decision. Suddenly, any use of the “F-word” was 
indecent.186 In 2006, in addition to fining broadcast networks an 
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unprecedented $4.5 million for Super Bowl nudity187 and teenage sex 
scenes,188 the Commission reaffirmed its 2004 holding that certain words 
are presumptively profane, even if fleeting and isolated.189 Now, the 
Commission was censuring Fox for the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music 
Awards, in which Cher and Nicole Richie used the words “fuck” and 
“shit,” respectively.190 
 
[108] Fox and its affiliates quickly appealed. The Commission argued that 
this “new” policy was merely an extension of the “first blow” theory 
articulated in Pacifica. There, the Supreme Court had held that expecting 
someone to turn off the radio when confronted with indecent language “is 
like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first 
blow.”191 But the Second Circuit didn’t buy that excuse: 
 
[T]he “first blow” theory bears no rational connection to 
the Commission’s actual policy regarding fleeting 
expletives. … [T]he Commission does not take the position 
that any occurrence of an expletive is indecent or profane 
under its rules. … [T]he Commission will apparently 
excuse an expletive when it occurs during a bona fide news 
interview. … The Commission even conceded that a re-
broadcast of precisely the same offending clips from the 
two Billboard Music Award programs for the purpose of 
providing background information on this case would not 
result in any action by the FCC, even though in those 
circumstances viewers would be subjected to the same 
“first blow” that resulted from the original airing of this 
material. Furthermore, the Commission has also held that 
even repeated and deliberate use of numerous expletives is 
not indecent or profane under the FCC’s policy if the 
expletives are “integral” to the work. … In all of these 
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scenarios, viewers … will have to accept the alleged “first 
blow” caused by use of these expletives. … The “first 
blow” theory, therefore, fails to provide the reasoned 
explanation necessary to justify the FCC’s departure from 
established precedent.192  
 
[109] In June 2007, the court held that the Commission had acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously, having failed to adequately justify its new 
stance on fleeting expletives.193 The court remanded, openly skeptical that 
the Commission could rationalize its fleeting expletive policy in a manner 
that would “pass constitutional muster.”194 Moreover, the court proffered 
eight pages of dicta questioning whether even the Commission’s general 
indecency test195 can survive First Amendment scrutiny. 
 
[110] As of the date of publication of this Article, the Commission has yet 
to respond. If on remand the Commission tries to justify its fleeting 
expletive policy, the networks will certainly appeal, and the case will go 
back to the Second Circuit, which has clearly telegraphed its intentions. 
Should the case end up in the Supreme Court, there is no telling what 
might happen. The newest justice, Samuel Alito, Jr., may be a social 
conservative, but he is also a First Amendment stalwart.196 In Pacifica, the 
Supreme Court noted that “[m]aking the sensitive judgments required in 
[indecency] cases is not easy. But this responsibility has been reposed 
initially in the Commission, and its judgment is entitled to respect.”197 If 
the court now finds that the FCC has capriciously pursued fleeting 
expletives, the consequence may be a simple response to Pacifica: “The 
Commission’s judgment is no longer entitled to respect.” 
 
[111] If the FCC continues to fight these skirmishes of principle, it risks 
losing the greater war as cable and DBS brazenly push the sexual envelope 
                                                 
192
 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 06-1760-AG, 2007 WL 1599032, at *24-26 (2d 
Cir. June 4, 2007).  
193
 Id. at *4. 
194
 Id. at *32. 
195
 See id. 
196
 Robert Barnes, Alito Calls Free-Speech Limits ‘Dangerous’ as Court Considers 
Cases, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 14, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/13/AR2007061302063_pf.html 
197
 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 4 
 
 46
with no fear of repercussions. Indecency costing broadcasters $325,000 
per violation is, literally, child’s play on basic cable. Putting aside dirty 
words for a moment, the Comedy Central cartoon South Park routinely 
depicts sexual acts some might consider so offensive that they cross the 
line from indecency to obscenity.  Episodes run the gamut from 
surprisingly clever to shockingly crude. In the first seasons of the show, 
the furthest writers went was creating a dancing piece of manure that 
“comes out once a year and gives presents to all the little boys and girls 
who have fiber in their diets.”198  In recent years, writers have pushed the 
envelope:  People excrete from their mouths, children sexually gratify 
animals, and a teacher inserts a live gerbil into his gay lover’s anus in 
front of a third grade class.199 Yet the FCC, which rained fire and 
brimstone on the San Diego radio station that aired a titillating song about 
candy bars, does nothing. 
 
[112] Nip/Tuck creator Ryan Murphy cavalierly proclaims that his goal is 
to make the airwaves safe for explicit sex.  “It’s tough to get that sexual 
point of view across on television.  Hopefully I have made it possible for 
somebody on broadcast television to do a rear-entry scene in three years.  
Maybe that will be my legacy.”200  Nip/Tuck, although an unabashed 
offender is but one of several sexually explicit shows broadcast on basic 
cable and DBS.201  The Parents Television Council recently conducted a 
study of the indecent content available on basic and “extended basic” 
cable channels, most of which are also available on DBS.202  The results 
are, to put it mildly, eye-opening, and they starkly call into question the 
government’s professed desire to protect the children and the sanctity of 
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the home.  Some excerpts of this study, which are too explicit to be 
reproduced here, document instances of indecent language, sexually 
explicit dialogue, on-screen nudity, masturbation, oral sex, threesomes, 
anal sex, bestiality, sadism and masochism, statutory rape and incest, all 
aired from early afternoon through late evening.203 
 
D. THE “A LA CARTE” OPTION 
 
[113] One goal of the study was to push for so-called “a la carte” 
subscription options.  As the name suggests, an a la carte subscription is 
one where people subscribe only to the channels they specifically select.  
Under Chairman Powell, the FCC soundly rejected the a la carte 
suggestion.  But when Chairman Kevin Martin took over, the FCC re-
examined the issue and ultimately endorsed it, not on the grounds that it 
would curb unwanted indecency, but because it would be more 
economically efficient.204  Authors of the Parents Television study prefer 
it for a related reason:  a la carte would allow parents to pick and choose 
family-friendly channels instead of being forced to subscribe to an entire 
basic cable package. Currently, in order to “gain access to wholesome and 
educational programming available on a handful of cable networks,” 
parents are “forced to pay for channels they don’t want and that actually 
make their job as a parent much more difficult.”205 
 
[114] It is true that a la carte subscription plans would effectively address 
the signal bleed concerns raised in Playboy, while being more 
economically efficient than the channel blocking solution accepted by the 
Supreme Court.  Ideally, cable and DBS operators could bundle 
indecency-free channels in a separately offered family-friendly tier. Then, 
instead of requesting a total block of a channel that a subscriber is paying 
for, someone with a distaste for indecency would only subscribe to the 
family-friendly tier. 
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[115] The problem is that a la carte is simply a lockbox by any other 
name, and would be completely ineffective at countering unexpected 
indecency on channels that are part of the supposedly family-friendly 
bundle. A la carte may mollify the Parents Television Council for the time 
being, but it seems more a stopgap measure than a lasting solution. 
 
[116] Nor would a la carte be effective against a phenomenon that could 
best be described as “trickle down indecency.”  The concept is simple:  
most programming available by subscription will eventually trickle down 
to free broadcast. Episodes of “Sex and the City,” once only available on 
the premium channel HBO, first trickled down to TBS (which only 
requires a subscription to basic cable), and then trickled down to late night 
broadcast television (which requires no subscription at all).  Episodes of 
“South Park,” once only available on the basic cable channel Comedy 
Central, trickled down a similar path.206  Even though the episodes are cut 
down to remove most indecent language and images, sexual situations are 
often central to the plot and cannot be removed. By turning a blind eye 
toward subscription services, the FCC tacitly condones the coarsening of 
broadcast television by way of sex-laden hand-me-downs. 
 
E. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
[117] If the government no longer wishes to devote its finite resources to 
fighting this battle, it should scale back or lift indecency regulations from 
free broadcast television and radio. Rescission of broadcast indecency 
rules would not be too difficult to accomplish, but the FCC could not do it 
alone. It would require a repeal of 18 USC § 1464, which would take 
Congressional and presidential approval.  Although the odds of this 
actually happening are low – especially considering Congress just voted to 
increase indecency fines tenfold – strong arguments exist. By imposing 
such stringent controls solely on free broadcast, the government is 
unnecessarily hampering one segment of the entertainment industry while 
adopting hands-off policies toward the rest of the industry.  This is 
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economically inefficient, arbitrary and capricious, and unfair to 
broadcasters. 
 
[118] Conversely, if the government truly is interested in preventing 
indecency from entering the home, it must do something about the gaping 
holes in its regulatory policies. Its current implementation makes one 
wonder whether the government is still sincere about the rationales 
expressed in Pacifica. If the FCC is going to accept Pacifica’s bequeathal 
of power so readily, it must also be prepared to embrace the goals 
espoused therein. 
 
[119] Expanding broadcast indecency rules to DBS would require nothing 
but an agency action. Currently 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 channels § 1464 
power to the Commission and allows it to regulate indecency on 
broadcast. By redefining subscription services as broadcast, the FCC 
would instantly gain control over indecency on DBS, which arrives in 
homes via radio communication. The FCC can find precedent for such 
actions by looking at the deeds of Congress itself: One of the underlying 
principles behind the 1987 Order’s exemption of subscription services 
from broadcast rules was the FCC’s general anti-regulatory stance. When 
Congress decided anyway in 1992 that all multipoint video services were 
subject to certain obligations and the D.C. Circuit Court approved the 
regulation in Time Warner, the FCC’s main rationale went out the 
window. 
 
[120] The cable industry has a stronger defense than DBS, because cable 
is by definition non-broadcast and therefore not subject to § 1464, which 
only applies to “radio communication.” However, the Communications 
Act does give the FCC general regulatory power over communications 
sent by wire – i.e. cable.  The FCC could argue that § 1464 does apply, 
because at some point during the cable transmission process, the signal is 
sent from one satellite to another using radio communications.  If that 
logic seems too specious, Congress could amend § 1464 to apply not just 
to broadcasts but to all “multichannel distributors.”  This is probably the 
easiest and best solution, as “multichannel distributors” encompasses most 
telecommunications technologies today and will be applicable far into the 
future. 
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[121] The cable industry would no doubt complain that Congress lacks the 
power to do this because the whole rationale for content regulation in the 
first place was spectrum scarcity, which does not apply to cable.  
However, the government could respond that scarcity hasn’t been a real 
rationale in 30 years:  the Supreme Court abandoned it in Pacifica, but that 
hasn’t stopped the government from regulating content on broadcast. And 
in Denver Area, the Court explicitly rejected the assertion that spectrum 
scarcity is involved in content restriction.  
 
[122] Perhaps the answer lies not in more regulations but in technology, 
not as the lockbox panacea it is often envisioned to be, but as a solution 
for bringing explicit material into one’s home at the time one wants.  As 
discussed above, blocking technology is nowhere near nuanced enough to 
be an appropriate solution, because it usually just gives parents two 
options:  Block an entire channel that they are paying for, or let the entire 
channel through.  However, technology is at the point where adults who 
“feel the need” to watch such programming, as Denver Area put it, can do 
so at the times they prefer.  Using “Digital Video Recorder” (DVR) 
technology, adults who want to watch sexual programming during the day 
can automatically record the programming when it airs at night, and then 
replay it at their leisure. Such DVR technology is readily available on 
most cable and DBS receivers, or available as an inexpensive add-on (e.g. 
TiVo).  A magic solution does not exist to block all unwanted 
programming from airing in the household during daylight hours, but 
DVR may be the magic solution that will allow adults to essentially “re-
broadcast” their desired nighttime programming during the day.  
Potentially, everybody wins. 
 
[123] It may be more productive for the government to explore 
technological fixes than to continue down its current path, increasing 
indecency fines tenfold and talking of a “showdown” over indecency with 
the cable industry.207  These solutions are simply recipes for protracted 
legal battles about the constitutionality of new provisions. 
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[124] Whatever the government decides to do, it must do something. 
Supporters and opponents of indecency regulation should be able to agree 
on at least one point:  It is in no one’s interest to have indecency laws 
inconsistently applied across mediums. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
[125] The topic of indecency regulation has the potential to instantly touch 
a nerve.  “Your right to protect your children from what you deem 
offensive” (they say with derision) “does not outweigh my right to get the 
programming that I want!  The government cannot be an arbiter of taste! 
The First Amendment is paramount.  If you don’t like what’s playing on 
television, turn it off. If you don’t want your children to watch so-called 
indecency, try actually parenting your kids instead of plopping them down 
in front of their electronic babysitter.” 
 
[126] Regardless of the merit of these positions, philosophizing about the 
proper role of parents, the government, and the correct level of interplay 
between them, has not been the aim of this paper. This paper has simply 
argued that, given Supreme Court precedent, the FCC can regulate 
indecency on cable and DBS; and if the government is really serious about 
its stated goal of protecting the children and the sanctity of the home, it 
should regulate indecency on cable and DBS.  To enforce staggering fines 
on free broadcast stations while ignoring indecency on all other 
technologies is simply disingenuous. 
 
[127] This article first examined federal statutes to determine the law and, 
correspondingly, the will of Congress. An examination of relevant case 
law followed, during which it became clear that the Supreme Court has 
never explicitly dealt with the question of broadcast-style indecency 
regulation of cable and DBS. That is, the Court has never ruled on whether 
the FCC has the ability to contextually decide what is indecent on modern 
entertainment technologies. However, the Supreme Court in Denver Area 
stated that cable presents even greater indecency concerns than broadcast, 
thus demonstrating that subscription services clearly call into play the 
issue of indecency. The Article next turned to a pair of FCC orders, both 
promulgated in 1987, which first expanded the definition of “indecency” 
and then limited the definition of “broadcasting,” thereby exempting 
subscription services like cable and DBS from broadcast-style regulations. 
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In 1992, Congress applied broadcast requirements to DBS and other 
multichannel distributors. Yet the FCC continues to exempt subscription 
services from indecency regulations, despite the fact that such services are 
just as pervasive as broadcast, and far more sexually explicit. The article 
then demonstrated the arbitrary and nonsensical outcomes that stem from 
the FCC’s disparate treatment of broadcast, cable and DBS. 
 
[128] Administrative agencies have long had authority to act on details 
with which the legislature has not explicitly dealt.  But in the case 
of DBS, the FCC is clearly going against the stated purpose of 18 USC § 
1464.  Section 1464 prohibits the utterance of indecency by radio 
communication; DBS technology unarguably uses radio communication. 
By continuing to exempt subscription services like DBS from indecency 
regulations, especially after Congress subjected DBS to other broadcast 
regulations in the 1992 Cable Act, the FCC is ignoring Congress’s 
mandate. Congress would be well within its rights to amend § 1464 to 
apply to all “multichannel distributors.” Given Supreme Court precedent, 
such a move would likely be constitutional. 
 
[129] Ultimately, the most important question may be a philosophical one. 
Where should the burden lie, with parents forced to defend their homes 
from an ever-increasing barrage of raunch and smut, or with people who 
actually enjoy that material? Which is harder: Keeping indecency out of 
the home, or bringing it into the home? Whose interests should the 
government seek to protect? Critics of regulation argue that in adopting an 
in loco parentis role, the government is infringing on the rights of adults to 
watch the content they want.  Supporters of regulation argue that because 
some people want sexually explicit material entering their home at all 
hours of the day and night, parents are unable to police the content that 
gets through the cracks, and need the government to help. It seems, then, 
the government has an important choice to make:  Whose interest is more 
compelling? 
